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READING MEDIEVAL STUDIES 
OCKHAM AND WYCLIF ON THE EUCHARIST 
A comparison of the eucharistic doctrines of Ockham and Wyclif 
exemplifies the opposition between what are traditionally called 
nominalism and realism. The opposition is made more manifest by the 
sustained manner in which each thinker sought to explain the eucharist 
according to his own philosophical and theological principles. Both 
incurred official censure of their efforts, Wyclif s views being declared 
heretical and becoming one of the main hallmarks of Lollardy.' 
What both thinkers had in common was a rejection of the prevailing 
explanation - associated especially with St. Thomas Aquinas - of 
how the original bread and wine of the host continued to appear as 
bread and wine after their substance had been converted into Christ's 
body and blood. This was that the appearances as bread and wine 
were maintained by the quantity belonging to the real bread and wine 
as it existed before their transubstantiation into Christ's being. Such 
an explanation involved two assumptions; first the belief - almost 
universally held until Wyclif - that accidents (i.e. the appearances) 
could be separated from the substance or nature to which they ordinarily 
belonged; and second that quantity could exist independently of 
substance as an absolute accident. Ockham opposed the second 
assumption; Wyclif both of them, including Ockham's alternative 
explanation which merely compounded Wyclifs indictment of existing 
doctrines, above all for reinforcing the first assumption, to Wyclif the 
most heinous blasphemy of all. 
The differences between Ockham and Wyclif spring essentially 
from a divergent ontology and with it a conflicting conception of what 
God can legitimately do. For Ockham all being was exclusively 
individual; species and genera were merely universal terms describing 
individuals of varying degrees of similarity; they represented no 
independent essences or natures, whether existing in or separately 
from individuals. The same applied to all properties or qualities; 
beyond their individual signification they had no real import. That 
left substance and quality as the only real - or, in Ockham's termin-
ology, absolute - constituents of being; all the other eight categories 
of Aristotle - quantity, relation, movement, time, place, and so on -
merely described substance and/or quality in their different states, 
and not something self-subsistent. Thus, relation was a connotative 
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term standing for two or more substances - such as father and Son -
or qualities - such as whiteness - in some kind of connex ion; 
paternity, filiation, s imilarity. And quantity connoted a substance or a 
quality having physical extension, in which its se parate parts had their 
own location in space. 2 For that reason the doctrine that the accidents 
of the bread and wine were upheld by quantity, after the conversion 
of their substance into Christ's body and blood, was to Ockham quite 
untenable. Quantity had no independent existence, but was merely a 
shorthand term meaning 'something (substance or quality) having part 
distant from part'. Without something which was extended there was 
no quantity. Hence quantity could not be separated from substance, 
as Aquinas and Scotus held .it could be , because in itself quantity was 
nothing: it was not therefore an absolute accident ; and the explanation 
of how the accidents of the bread and wine could subsist after their 
substance had vani shed could not be had through recourse to quantity. 
Wyclif agreed; but from a ·very different s tandpoint which led to 
a diametrically opposed account both of tran substantiation and what 
became of the bread and wine as a resul t. Where Ockham denied the 
reality of all but individuals, Wyclif saw the source of all reality in 
the universal natures in essences informing every being. These 
derived from the archetypes or intelligible being (esse intelligibi/e) 
which God had of all possible and actual creatures. Now, as part of 
his own being, his inte lligible being was eternal and indestructible; 
so therefore, Wyclif concluded, was all created being in belonging 
to iLl Accordingly, he refused to accept transubstantiation as the 
supersession of one substance by another; for that would entail the 
annihilation of what was transubstantiated. He equally denied that 
an accident could be separated from its substance because that too 
violated the immutable order that God had decreed where there wa s an 
eternal sequence from intelligible being in God to potential and actual 
being among creatures. To accept their separability would make 
nonsense of the universe, just as to accept the destructibility of a 
substance would engender the de structibility of the entire univetse 
whose being was allied to the inte lligible being in God. Quantity was 
not therefore an absolute accident which could be the subject of the 
bread's and the wine's appearances, because there were no separable 
accidents. In contrast to Ockham Wyclifs rejection of quantity's 
independence was subsumed under a refusal to accept any mode of 
being other than s ubstance and hence the inseparability of all 
accident s, although it is not clear whether he denied the existence of 
all ab solute accidents. 
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Not surprisingly such divergent presuppositions led to very differ-
ent accounts of the eucharist. Ockham's main purpose· was to show 
the compatibility of transubstantiation as an article of faith with the 
ontological truth accessible to natural reason that only s ubstance and 
quality are real, and the theological truth that whatever is absolute 
God, as creator and conserver of the world, can create or conserve 
independently of any other absolute to which it is ordinarily joined 
in nature. The reason was the further universally accepted theological 
truth that God can do whatever does not entail a contradiction; and 
where two things are distinct in their nature, as substance and 
accident, matter and form, cause and effect all are, God can separate 
one from the other. Conversely he can join what is ordinarily separate, 
making one thing subsist totally in another (as the soul does in the 
body or an angel in its location) or one substance in two bodies, or 
two or more bodies simultaneously in the same place.s Since, however, 
that can only occur through God's direct intervention, the separation 
of the bread's substance from its appearances in the eucharist can only 
be accounted for by God's omnipotence. From the outset, therefore, 
the eucharist must be regarded as the result of a miracle which 
surpasses the natural course of events. The ultimate appeal must be 
beyond nature to God; but it can enlist the help of nature in making it 
intelligible. 
Through their convergence Ockham sought to explain what for 
him was the central problem, of how with the supersession of the 
bread's substance by Christ's physical presence there is on the one 
hand substance - Christ's body - without quantity , and, on the other, 
qualities - colour, shape, size - without substance in the continuance 
of the bread's appearances which remain accessible to the senses. 
In view of Wyclirs contrary interpretation it is perhaps worth remarking 
that Ockham's position was founded upon unqualified acceptance of 
all the main tenets concerning the eucharist: namely, that with the 
conversion of the bread on the altar into Christ's body nothing of the 
bread remained except its accidental qualities or appearances which 
now co-existed with Christ's body. He thus affirmed that the body of 
Christ is really present in the host under the appearances of the bread 
and wine, that it is hidden from the bodily eye - although absolutely, 
like Duns Scotus, he saw no reason why it should not have been seen 
corporeally ' - and that Christ is present in the whole host simultan-
eously in every part of it.7 None of these points is for him, unlike 
Wyclif, at issue. His principal concern, especially in his two special 
treatises on the eucharist, On the Sacrament of the Altar and On 
Chris,' s Body, was to explain how since quantity is not an absolute 
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accident it can be separated from Christ's body really present in the 
host and from accidents of the bread and wine which no longe r have 
substance. 
For Ockham, transubstantiation meant the cessation of onc 
substance and its succession by another, only the accidents of the 
fir s t substance remaining to coexist with the second substance.s With 
Duns Scotus he saw their connexion as extrinsic, as one of displace-
me nt, and not intrin s ic, as Aquinas did , in the conversion of one 
substance - the bread - into another - Christ's body. On Ockham's 
view only the bread changes - from be ing to non-be ing; Christ's 
body as the other term merely changes its location - from heaven to 
the host where the bread previously was, Transubstantiation, therefore, 
involved a double change, in the loss of the bread's substance and the 
acquisition of Christ's body.' Each is independent of the other; hence 
the bread need not have been tran substantiated for Christ's body to 
change its pos ition from heaven to the sacrament. He still remains in 
heaven; but he also acquires a new place. ll) Moreover, it is a change 
of place and not to his own substance; and affects, as we shall 
consider in a moment, only his new mode of inherence, which differs 
in the eucharist from that which he has in heaven.ll So far as the 
bread is concerned , it entirely loses its substance. In his earlier 
writings on the subject, in his Commentary on the Sentences. Ockham 
s poke of the bread's annihilation, for which he was censured by the 
chancellor of Oxford University, John Lutterell;" later, probably as a 
resul t of this criticism, he said ins tead that the bread and wine ceased 
to exist. 11 The import remained the same: namely that the bread and 
WlOe no longer remained anything in the mse lves but became something 
el se. 
So far there is little here not found in previous accounts, especially 
by Duns Scotus. It was over the explanation of how Chri s t inheres 
in the host and accidents are separated from substance that Ockham -
and WycJif - diverge from their predecessors. They do so, as we have 
said, by denying that quantity, as a te rm connoting substance extended 
in s pace, can ever be separated from substance. But whereas for 
Wyclif that meaning was invariable, as the relation between substance 
and accident was invariable, for Ockham quantity referred only to 
corporeal substance. Spiritual beings, like angels and the human 
soul, were without extension; they occupied space, in the terminology 
of the time, definitively, where all their parts were totally present in 
the same place and throughout that place , as opposed to each having 
it s own place - circumscriptively - which was the mode of corporeal 
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beings. Only the latter involved quantity. Where substance was 
definitive there was none. 14 Accordingly to Ockham quantity was not 
an essential attribute of substance, but, as he expressed it, only 
accidentally predicable of substance, when it meant a substance 
having spatially distinct parts. IS 
On the basis of that distinction - ignored by Wycl if - Ockham 
was then able to explain how Christ could inhere in the host as 
substance without quantity: namely as any spiritual being, definitively, 
with all his parts occupying the same space and in every part of that 
space without extension. No greater credulity was required than in 
the case of the soul or angels. Each was a matter of faith; but none 
required any special explanation, beyond the recognition in the case 
of the eucharist that it occurred by a miracle in that Christ continued 
to exist physically in the heaven - which he occupied circumscriptively 
as a substance also having quantity - and yet was enabled to be 
present - non .. quantitatively - in every individual host. 16 
As for the other problem, of what maintained the accidents or 
the appearances of bread and wine after their substance had been 
displaced by Christ's being, Ockham equally dispensed with the notion 
that they were maintained by quantity. On the contrary quality is , 
after substance, the 9nly other absolute accident; it therefore had its 
own identity independently of quantity. It is true that the qualities 
of the erstwhile bread and wine - their shape, length , breadth, depth -
do have quantity; but since they are those of bread and wine, and not 
Christ's body, they are now only accidents which are maintained, not 
by quantity (which cannot exist by itself), but by God's omnipotence. 
No contradiction is involved just because, as we have seen, whatever 
is onto logically absolute, can, if God so wills, be separated from 
whatever else is absolute. That applies to all substance and quality, 
and so to the substance and appearances of the bread and wine.17 
The symmetry of these conclusions derives from their concurrence 
with natural phe nomena, the citing of which forms the major part of 
Ockham's different discussions. On the one hand, substance does not 
necessarily have quantity; on the other quality can be separated from 
substance as any accident can be separated from its subject. The 
occurrence of each depends upon God's special intervention, ' but in 
accordance with the laws that he had decreed for thi s world. Thus, 
in the first case, Ockham takes the occurrence of condensation and 
rarefaction as quantitative changes in the location of a subject's parts: 
the closer they come together, the denser the substance; the further 
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apart the more rarefied. Each is thus due to nothing but a change in 
place of their parts, leading them to occupy more or less space. Since 
that can happen to any divisible - i.e. corporeal - being, it is not 
impossible, he argues, for such a being (including man) to become so 
condensed that it ceases to be extended, as Christ is in the eucharist. u 
No violation of the course of nature is therefore involved in positing 
Christ's separate inherence in the eucharist. 
Correspondingly, in the separation of accidents from substance, 
Ockham calls upon nature and logic to show that quantity is not an 
independent, absolute accident, as well as to argue theologically that 
it is logically permissible for God to separate whatever is absolute -
namely substance and quality as subject and accident - and maintain 
one without the other. Henc~, if matter were prior to quantity, related 
as subject to accident, God could then destroy quantity, as subsequent 
to matter. and preserve matter without quantity - which would be 
nonsense. 19 Again, if a piece of wood is sawn in two, no new substance 
is generated. There are now two parts of the same whole. Hence they 
cannot have been in the same place in the beginning; and if one of the 
parts is then destroyed, and not the other, they again cannot have been 
in the same place. 20 Thus it is as the same substance that they have 
the same, or different, or less, quantity. Again, since a substance is 
always prior to its accident, it can exist without an accident; if there-
fore a substance is extended in space with quantity as an absolute 
accident inhering in it, it could be so extended before the advent of 
that accident." These all illustrate the superfluity of treating quantity 
as an absolute, when all that really exists are substance and quality, 
which when corporeal, have quantity as one of their attributes, but 
from which quantity cannot exist apart. 
It is fair to say that Ockham's main concern in the eucharist was 
philosophical, or to be anachronistic, 'scientific', in reconciling it 
with his interpretation of nature as consistin.g exclusively of substance 
and quality. Although censured by L)Jtterell he had no theological 
axes to grind or new interpretations to offer of the eucharist as a 
sacrament. The same cannot be said of WyC\if. Both philosophically 
and theologically his position was unprecedented. Philosophically his 
point of departure was, as has been said, first that all substance was 
indestructable and so transubstantiation, as the cessation of one 
substance and its replacement by another, unthinkable; and second 
that accident was inseparable from substance so that the quantity of 
bread and wine could not remain after their substance had vanished. 
The first led Wyclif to deny the doctrine of transubstantiation as it 
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had come to be understood, indeed to deny the very phenomenon itself; 
the second to attack the twin blasphemies - which he tended to join 
but were separately held as we have seen in the case of Ockham on 
the one hand and Aquinas and Scotus on the other - that the accidents 
of the bread and wine remained and were maintained by quantity as an 
absol ute accident. 
Wyclifs arguments, unlike Ockham's, were an almost inextricable 
jumble or the philosophical, theological, moral, ecclesiological and 
polemical. Of his numerous writings on the sacrament, De Aposlasia 
has the most coherence; even here, however, there arc the same 
digressions, repetitions, and assertions. But those very traits also 
leave no one in any doubt of his position. It is that since transubstantia-
tion is inconceivable, what occurs in the sacrament of eucharist is not 
the displacement or the substance or the bread and wine by Christ, 
but the advent or Christ to the bread and wine. That is to say some-
thing new is added, but nothing or the old substance is lost. In 
WycliPs own words, 'Just as Christ is of two substances, earthly and 
divine, so is this sacrament ... And as the word did not by the 
Incarnation lose its eternal substance, but retained its nature, newly 
becoming something tha.t it was not before , so in a certain way the 
bodily bread, remaining the substance of bread, miraculously, becomes 
the body of Christ, not identically according to his substance or nature, 
but riguratively. It is not, however, falsely or improperly called 
Christ's body, but truly and properly, so that the sacrament should not 
be called two bodies but one, with Christ's the principal body'." 
Christ's presence is not therefore physical, but figurative or 
sacramental, and coexists with the substance of the bread and wine 
which lose none of their identity. 
Wyclifs position meant two fundamental shifts away from the 
hitherto accepted onc. The first was over the presence of Christ. 
Wyclif distinguished between the eucharist in its natural form as bread 
and wine and in its sacramental import. In the latter sense Christ was 
really and truly present spiritually in the host, as he was not in a mere 
sign for him such as a crucifix. But at the same time that did not for 
Wyclif, as it had for Ockham and his predecessors, mean that Christ 
was there in his own person. Wyclif gave none of Ockham's considera-
tion to the problem of Christ's mode of existence in the host, because 
he did not conceive him in the eucharist in a personal" manner; nor 
indeed did lVyclir ever speciry what he meant by Christ's spiritual 
presence beyond affirming that he was really there in virtue of Christ's 
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own words that the bread was his body. It is this Imprecision, and 
the denial of Christ's actual presence as a person occupying an actual 
location, in the way envisaged by Ockham, that has led to the wide-
spread charge that Wyclif denied Christ's real presence. I do not 
think it can be sustained; but it is also true that, despite his constant 
assertions, it is virtually impossible to know how Wyclif did under-
stand Christ's presence. This failure is compounded by his second 
great innovation: his insistence that the bread and wine remain bread 
and wine, so that they are not transubstantiated in the sense that 
they lose their own substance for another; instead they receive a 
new spiritual import, making them the signs for Christ's sacramental 
presence. This doctrine - known as remanence - became the hallmark 
of WycliPs eucharist heresy in seeming to deny, as in a formal sense 
it did, what was understood by transubstantiation. Again, that was 
to misunderstand Wyclif, whose grounds were quite simply his refusal 
to accept that anything could be destroyed, but not that something new 
could not come to change it. 
Wyclifs arguments for his standpoint revolved round the implica-
tions of the existing doctrine. Like Ockham, but from the opposite 
extreme, he sought to show how the assumptions that substance 
could be separated from accidents, including quantity, and that some-
thing could be destroyed, undermined the whole of God's dispensation. 
He invoked God's omnipotence equally to uphold his reading of nature. 
Thus it would be contradictory for God to separate substance from 
accident, since by definition an accident must inhere in a subject 
and cannot exist without doing so. In his own words, 'As [God] cannot 
permit a creature to exist without him, so he cannot permit an accident 
without a subject'. II The separation of accidents from substances 
would also undermine all knowledge, since it would destroy any 
certainty and make everything illusory. It would then be impossible 
to pass beyond our sense impressions to their underlying reality; 
all knowledge of nature, essence, movement and so on would vanish. 24 
It would also lead to idolatry, in worshipping accidents, the lowest 
form of existence, instead of Christ's body." There was therefore 
no need here for the miraculous explanation given by his predecessors, 
including Ockham, since no special intervention by God was required 
to explain how accidents existed without their substance. They did 
not; and one of the features of Wyclifs discussion is his renunciation 
of the miraculous to explain what is in accordance with God's ord~ 
inance, and his opposition to those who invoked God's omnipotence 
to override it. 26 
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Similarly, in his attack upon transubstantiation Wyclif sought by 
a variety of arguments to prove that the annihilation or disappearance 
of the bread would mean the destruction of all matter, whose esse 
intelligible it shared, and so the destruction of the universe. 27 Con~ 
version of the bread did not involve its destruction or transformation 
into what it was not. In attributing the power of transubstantiation 
to the priest's words of consecration it also. morally, represented the 
worst blasphemy of all, that a creature could of itself create and 
destroy.28 That in turn would impl icate God in improvidence and 
destruction in a world in which every part depends upon every other 
part, hence leading to the annihilation of his own creation. 29 
As to quantity as the subject of the appearances, not only would 
it again mean worshipping an accident but the basest and most un .. 
suitable of accidents. As the inseparable accompaniment of matter, 
quantity was passive and thus incapable of sustaining the physical 
activity of the eucharist. Moreover, any change to it would, Wyclif 
belie ved, lead to a new eucharist, since he regarded all rareraction 
and condensation as involving a change in matter. Quality would in 
fact be much better suited to the role assigned to quantity; but neither 
can be without a subject. As for Christ's quantity, it is only in heaven 
where he exists dimensionally; in the host he is only, as has been 
said, there spiritually." Similarly his body is not simultaneously in 
every part of the host,31 as to Ockham he was; nor, for that matter, is 
the human soul either. That, too, for Wyclif was against nature, and 
he opposed the arguments (given currency by Ockham) based upon them 
almost as consistently as those (also from Ockham) founded upon the 
separability of accident and substance, Wyclirs opposition suggests 
that he did not recognise definitive existence as the mode appropriate 
to spiritual bodies. Christ, he averred, is present in the host figura-
tively, as a king in his kingdom; his sign is in every part of it, but he 
is not simultaneously present with it. 32 One host was distinguished 
from another as members of the same species by the individual bread 
and wine." Neither Christ nor quantity, then, is the subject of what 
must remain bread and wine. 
Finally, there was the opposite blasphemy, of the identification 
of the bread and wine with Christ's body, which was the special object 
of his other main treatise on the eucharist, De Eucharistia. This 
involved the sacrilege of associating Christ's body with generable and 
corruptible matter so that, like it, his body would putrify or become 
sour with the degeneration of the bread and wine, be broken and eaten, 
by priest or by animals, and his blood spilt if the wine were upseL" 
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It also led to perhaps the supreme blasphemy, that the priest, through 
speaking the words of consecration. could make Christ's body. whereas 
in fact they are merely the instrument through which God works his 
miracle. 5s Perhaps his abhorrence of these consequences accounts 
for Wyclifs insistence that Christ was not present personally in the 
host, thereby dissociating him from any physical connexion with its 
material elements. Christ, Wyclif asserted, is no more physically the 
object of eating the bread and drinking the wine than the Sun is broken 
when we break a window. 16 What, he asks, could be more awful than 
Christ being carried by the priest or being touched by his fingers?" 
A priest cannot consecrate Christ's body because it is already holy." 
Wyclifs defence of his concept of the eucharist was also an attack on 
priestly pretensions; each became increasingly ferocious in the last 
three years of his life as De Blasphemia, the third - and most extreme 
and disordered - of his works devoted to the eucharist, shows. His 
doctrine of transubstantiation became part of his condemnation of the 
church hierarchy and the religious orders as Antichrist. Whatever 
ministered to human agency was excluded or diminished. 
To that extent there was a rapport with Ockham's stress upon 
divine omnipotence. Where they differed was over their radically 
different ontologies for which God's omnipotence was invoked. For 
Ockham it illustrated the inherent contingency of the whole of creation 
so that whatever was real could, through God's intervention, exist 
independently of anything else, however dependent it was by God's 
existing dispensation. The miracle of the eucharist merely illustrated 
that truth, including its converse that quantity was not an independent 
reality and so was inseparable from material - but not spiritual -
substance. Far then from entailing an alternative order of reality. the 
eucharist for Ockham expressed God's power to uphold absolute beings 
in their own natures without reference to anything. For Wyclif, on the 
other hand, the eucharist was explicable only in terms of the insepara-
bility of accident from substance and the indestructibility of all being. 
He therefore took an entirely opposed view of what was possible. Or 
rather he was principally concerned in showing that transubstantiation 
as traditionally understood was impossible. It involved quite another 
view of the order of nature and the order of knowledge. Whatever the 
senses testify to - as in the case of the bread and wine which continue 
to be seen after the host's consecration - must really exist; and they 
exist on the basis of the continuance of all being both according to its 
intrinsic essence or nature and in its inseparable attributes. 
Consequently, for Wyclif transubstantiation could not be a physical 
but solely a spiritual occurrence: in the addition of the sacramental, 
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or figurative, presence of Christ to the consecrated bread and wine. 
On that view there was not even the possibility, posited by Ockham 
and Duns Scotus, that had God so willed Christ could have been seen 
corporeally in the host, because Christ was only present spiritually.39 
Hence, where Ockham had seen the resonance between nature and 
divine omnipotence in the logical extension of the individual attributes 
of all being, Wyclif saw it in the ineluctable maintenance of the status 
quo. The eucharist could therefore have no physical basis, as it had 
for his predecessors; it could only be explained as the superimposition 
of the sacramental upon the physical, whose modes remained immutable. 
That was Wyclifs novelty and became his heresy, in for the first 
time eschewing any but a spiritual meaning of transubstantiation. 
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